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What is less well known, perhaps, is that culture-and-personality s dressed many of the other issues of their day, including aggression, fasci criminality, and international relations. In all of these areas, they rep played biological theories of group difference and applied and populari personality approach. Over several decades, from the late 1920s to the tried to explain differences in human behavior by looking to culture and how specific groups transmitted culture from one generation to the they forged a particular version of social constructionist thought in the m century United States.
From early on, the culture-and-personality school also had an abiding in ality. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the anthropologists Bronislaw garet Mead, and Ruth Benedict popularized a cultural approach to sex to comment on homosexuality. Other scholars then adopted, adapted, Three of them -Otto Klineberg, Ashley Montagu, and Abram Kardin trace the conjuncture of race and sex in the culture-and-personality vision wrote important popular books on race, in which they applied variant and-personality thesis, and each also wrote on sexuality. Sexuality and rac not equivalent categories, and the culture-and-personality scholars did such. Nonetheless, they applied much the same approach to sex, espec ity, that they applied to race. By focusing on the authors who wrote abou sexuality, we can begin to explore a metanarrative that reconstituted inte in multiple domains in the twentieth century. We can show how understa and sexuality developed in tandem, mutually constituted through an of "how common culture shapes the separate lives."2 The culture-andings do not, of course, cover the entire range of cultural or intellectual c race, sexuality, or social constructionism in the mid-twentieth century, b us to see how twentieth-century social constructionist thought combi between a cultural relativism that valued noninvidious distinctions and a concern with health that treated difference as pathology.
They also help us discern the outlines of a distinctive form of biopolitics. For the past two decades, scholars have studied the "biologization" of the social categories of race, gender, and sexuality. Many see the late eighteenth century as a turning point and the nineteenth century as the full flowering of a widespread shift in American and European social thought. In these histories, scientists, in particular, gained new authority as they increasingly classified populations and tied the perceived traits of particular groups to biological moorings. What happened, though, when the biological paradigm began to v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) .
2 W. H. Auden, "Heavy Date," 1939 , in Collected Shorter Poems, 1930 -1944 , by W. H. Auden (London, 1950 , 1 16. A few recent works have pointed to the interlinked construction of race and sexuality in early and mid-twentieth-century social science, especially in sociological thought. See, for example, Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America (New York, 2001) ; and Roderick A. Ferguson, Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique (Minneapolis, 2004) . For recent works that look at other conjoined and overlapping constructions of race and sexuality in modern U.S. history, see, for example, Siobhan B. Somerville, Queering the Color Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in American Culture (Durham, 2000) ; Lisa Duggan, Sapphic Slashers: Sex, Violence, and American Modernity (Durham, 2000) ; Nayan Shah, "Between 'Oriental Depravity' and 'Natural Degenerates': Spatial Borderlands and the Making of Ordinary Americans," American Quarterly, 57 (Sept. 2005) , 703-25; Julian B. Carter, The Heart of Whiteness: Normal Sexuality and Race in America, 1880 -1940 (Durham, 2007 ; and Chad Heap, Slumming: Sexual and Racial Encounters in American Nightlife, 1885 -1940 (Chicago, 2009 ).
Sexuality, Race, and Social Constructionist Thought 1059 fall apart? Historians have paid more attention to eugenics and its increasingly defensive advocates and less attention to the competing biopolitics of twentieth-century social constructionists. In the areas of race and sexuality (and almost everything else), the culture-and-personality scholars called for various kinds of "social engineering," including a liberal form of biopolitics that would reconfigure a groups behavior and health by reshaping the personalities of its members. To put it simply, they replaced race with culture and nature with nurture, and in so doing, they rejected eugenics (or the biopolitics of childbearing) and promoted instead a biopolitics of child rearing. "Spanking the baby may be the psychological seed of war," announced one newspaper article in 1 94 1 . The article -on the anthropologist Ashley Montagu -suggested that child rearing practices could increase or reduce aggression, militarism, and racism. The way to enhance the quality of a population was not through selective breeding of so-called races but through selective nurturing of certain cultural traits. "This time," one critical commentator noted in 1949, "it is not 'blood' that predetermines a people's character, as the Nazi philosophy taught, but methods of rearing children."3
Two Histories
The standard accounts of the intellectual history of race and homosexuality trace two different histories, or two different genealogies, of the early and mid-twentieth century.
That is, the story historians typically tell about race or ethnicity is different from the one usually told about sex. On race, the story, in simplified form, goes like this: In the early twentieth century, the African American civil rights activist and scholar W. E. B. Du Bois and the German-Jewish immigrant anthropologist Franz Boas took the lead in repudiating the dominant racialist thought that had posited biology as the key to differences between national, ethnic, and racial groups. Du Bois, Boas, and others emphasized culture rather than race, and in American intellectual circles their position came to predominate by the 1930s and especially during and after World War II. This new position pointed out minor physical differences between so-called races but attributed perceived differences in behavior, traits, or intelligence to culture or environment. It helped discredit, as it intended, the evolutionary vision of the eugenicists (and the Nazis), who considered certain groups inherently inferior. The students of Franz Boas took the lead in this endeavor, along with other social scientists and civil rights activists who had inherited the legacy of Du Bois. They eventually had this cultural emphasis, with its repudiation of most innate group differences, written into policy and law. In most histori-3 By biopolitics, I refer to policies or policy prescriptions that aimed to manage, regulate, or administer the life and health of populations. This definition is influenced by Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1 : An Introduction (New York, 1978) , 133-60. For an interesting account of the eighteenth-century shift toward biological explanations, see Dror Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven, 2004) . For a historiographie essay on eugenics, see Frank Dikötter, "Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics," American Historical Review, 103 (April 1998), 467-78. For other recent works on eugenics in the United States, see Wendy Kline, Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom (Berkeley, 2001) ; Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley, 2002) ; Nancy Ordover, American Eugenics: Race, Queer Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism (Minneapolis, 2003) ; and Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America (Berkeley, 2005) . For a book that looks at (non-eugenic) behaviorist "human engineering," see Rebecca Lemov, World as Laboratory: Experiments with Mice, Mazes, and Men (New York, 2005) . "Anthropologist Finds Psychological Seed of War in Baby Spanking," Boston Sunday Globe, Jan. 5, 1941, p. 2; David J. Dallin, "Exterminate the Russians?," New Leader, Oct. 29, 1949, p. 2. cal accounts, this is a story of how liberals fought against racism an demolish legalized racial segregation.4
On homosexuality, the story has a different narrative arc. In the now lectual history, Sigmund Freud assumes an early leading role in reje theories that had posited homosexuals as physically and inherently diff sexuals. In the emerging view, homosexuals were not the constitutional erates or the somatic "third sex" that several late nineteenth-and early sexologists had suggested they were. In the early twentieth century, Fr ers turned to psychodynamic development as the critical force in creat sexual-object choice. This new position appeared more widely in Am cles in the 1930s and in American popular culture after World War II. S including those who broke with him, played a central part in rejecting of homosexuality at the same moment that students of Boas helped theories of racial difference. But the political valence here differed. Ps that homosexuality was a psychic disease. In the United States, the the neo-Freudians, and their popularizers all increasingly attributed pat ual behavior to early parent-child interactions. For example, homose some accounts, when unhealthy mothers smothered or dominated th The psychoanalysts (and their popularizers) pathologized homosexua ers), not as inherently defective or criminal, but as neurotic, imma maladjusted. In recent historical tellings, this is not a story of liberals is, rather, a story of how scholars reformulated and reinforced popular an already stigmatized group.5
In these parallel histories of race and homosexuality, mid-twentiet critiqued earlier studies that had attempted to correlate psychic and be with biological metrics, such as brain size, cranial structure, hip width, quantity of hormones, and in both accounts, these scholars understood as primarily human-made, contingent, and changeable. But even th trace how certain scholars rejected biological explanations, the two narr ferent causal theories, distinct programs of action, and, in the end, div
In one history, social scientists joined with (and became) activists w tural arguments to promote intergroup cooperation and racial integ psychotherapists used psychological arguments to foist "cures" on they construed as neurotic and perverse, and in the postwar years, gay ists and their allies increasingly opposed them.
Culture and Personality
The two histories are not wholly incorrect, but they disregard the sign the mid-twentieth-century intellectual histories of race and sexuality.
Sexuality, Race, and Social Constructionist Thought 1061 ing link is the culture-and-personality school, which brought together anthropology and psychology, especially Boasian anthropology and neo-Freudian psychoanalysis. The culture-and-personality scholars defined culture as a form of "social inheritance" and then tried to explain how a social inheritance might be transmitted from one generation to the next, that is, how a culture reproduces itself. If not via biology, if not through heredity, then how are children shaped toward (or how do they come to deviate from) the normative behavior of their own societies? The kind of question the culture-and-personality theorists asked repeatedly was, "how does a Chinese baby grow up to be Chinese and not French?" If Chineseness is not an innate characteristic, then what is it and how is it passed on? For the culture-and-personality scholars, child rearing and personality formation were integral parts of the answer to the cultural transmission question. In 1935, the anthropologist Margaret Mead summed up the emerging view: "We are forced to conclude that human nature is almost unbelievably malleable. . . . The differences between individuals . . . are almost entirely to be laid to differences in conditioning, especially during early childhood, and the form of this conditioning is culturally determined."6
The culture-and-personality networks emerged in the late 1920s and early 1930s when a few anthropologists began to take an interest in how cultures shape individuals. The anthropologist Edward Sapir, a student of Boas, is often credited as a founding father of the school. In a series of influential essays published in the 1930s, he called for "cultural anthropology and psychiatry" to "join hands." He asked anthropologists to study individual variation and human interrelationships, and he asked psychiatrists to pay greater attention to the transmission of culture. By writing books for the general public, Ruth
Benedict and Margaret Mead popularized the early culture-and-personality vision. By the 1930s, a handful of psychoanalysts had joined the anthropologists. The German émi-grés Karen Horney and Erich Fromm and the American Harry Stack Sullivan emerged as key leaders of the neo-Freudian school that insisted on the importance of culture and environment in psychic development. All of these scholars knew each other. They corresponded and met together at conferences and in seminars, and they clustered in a few institutional centers, including Yale University's Institute of Human Relations, Columbia
In their influence and their public standing, the culture-and-personal at the center of an American scholarly elite, but they were hardly repr an era when most American academics were white, Protestant, native-b the culture-and-personality networks included a surprising number of women, and people known (to their friends then and to scholars n an.8 They were outsiders of sorts and internationalists as well, and as s a "deprovincializing" and "cosmopolitan" influence to American soc to-left in their politics, they engaged as public intellectuals with th of their era, including the debates over immigration, eugenics, and the rejection of "puritan" ideals, the women's movement, the failures o ing the Great Depression, and the rise of fascism in Europe. As the linger notes, their vision of "cultural relativism" constituted "a major e lectual history of the twentieth century, rather than simply another m discipline."9
But the culture-and-personality scholars also had impact well beyo tory. movements, and their popular books and articles, the culture-and-personality scholars had widespread impact in foreign policy, education, child rearing, and social reform.
To give just a few examples (not mentioned elsewhere in this essay), their wartime work shaped programs in psychological warfare, their writings on national character influenced the postwar occupation of Japan, and their vision of intercultural cooperation lay at the heart of the late 1940s unesco project to reduce international tensions. Their emphasis on (and popularization of) the concept of "culture" contributed to the celebration of diversity in the intercultural education movement of the 1930s and 1940s, the early American studies programs of the 1950s that emphasized American character, and the training of teachers in the Peace Corps in the 1960s and after. Their notions of child rearing informed the emerging fields of child development and family therapy, both of which had a heightened concern with mothering. Culture-and-personality scholars also had direct connections with the pediatrician Benjamin Spock, who wrote the most influential child rearing guides of the twentieth century. And their understanding of culturally constructed "sex roles" reappeared in later writings on gender.10 In an era when public intellectuals had greater clout than they do today, the culture-and-personality school managed to leave its handprint on an impressive range of social and political issues.
The Cultural Construction of Sexuality
Though some of the culture-and-personality scholars showed more interest in sexuality than others, virtually all of them addressed it in one way or another. In the early twentieth century, the anthropological study of culture and the psychoanalytic study of personality were both already known (even notorious) for their (scandalous) investigations of sexual behavior. When the culture-and-personality school emerged in the late 1920s and early 1930s, it generally acknowledged, and provided research to support, the modernist revolt against "sexual repression." In its popular variant, the modernist rebellion drew on a handful of scholarly works (as well as on various other writings, mass media, and everyday observations). The sexual modernists especially gravitated to Freudian formulations in which sexual repression was seen as the source of neuroses, but they tended to downplay the equally Freudian concept that repression was also the source of "civilization." Their popular critique also selectively mined ethnographic surveys of "primitive" cultures to highlight by contrast the sexual problems of "civilization. applauded the Trobriand Islanders, who had "no condemnation of sex such," and contrasted them with the British, whose "repressions o pecially among the higher classes" led to "clandestine inquisitions in Likewise, Mead found that the Samoans' "knowledge of sex and the ment" contributed to their easy "adjustment," without the adolescent c roses that she thought marked her own society. Although neither d or endorsed "promiscuity," they both saw benefits in cultures that wrote, "a great deal of freedom and many opportunities for sexual expe
For the sexual modernists, Malinowski and Mead offered edifying cas native sexual customs. In its more popular forms, "romantic cultural ex the hierarchy of evolutionary thought, predominant in the late nin which white "civilized morality" stood above the customs of the da tives." By the 1920s, the alleged freedom of "primitives" served as tion for those middle-and upper-class Americans and Britons who straints of "puritan" and "Victorian" repression. As the renowned sexol 14 Francis L. K. Hsu, "The Cultural Problem of the Cultural Anthropologist," American A 1979), 571-32; Micaela di Leonardo, Exotics at Home: Anthropologies, Others, American M that differed substantially from the hereditarian and evolutionary theories that placed the colonizers above the colonized. For the anthropologists, sex was not just a natural drive; it was shaped, conditioned, and constructed by cultures. The so-called primitives and savages were not inherently different from Americans or Europeans, their alleged sexual freedom was not a result of innate sexual propensities but culturally conditioned, and their behavior was not necessarily lower or lesser than the sexual behavior of anyone else.
Within the anthropological discussions of sex lay an interest in homosexuality. For many sexual modernists, including Mead, the 1 920s were years of sexual experimentation. In her middle-and upper-class professional and literary circles, some women had sexual relationships with women as well as men. She herself had such relationships, including a deep and enduring -and for a time sexual -friendship with her teacher Ruth Benedict. In the interwar years, women's romantic friendships, a staple of nineteenthcentury middle-class life, were still understood to be common, especially in women's colleges, but they were increasingly seen as sexual as well as spiritual. With a heightened awareness of "perversion," "mixed [bisexual] types," and "homosexuality," women (and men) reinterpreted the meaning of what they called "crushes." The emerging scientific literature offered few alternatives to the dominant disease model, but at least a handful of commentators cast homosexuality as "a variation of sexuality rather than an extreme abnormality." The anthropological interest in sex reflected these developments. In 1925, when the eminent Franz Boas prepared his student Mead for her fieldwork in Samoa, he directed her to inquiries about adolescence and asked her specifically to pay attention to "crushes among girls."15
Given the social and intellectual context in which homosexuality was still widely condemned as sinful or perverse, the anthropologists generally endorsed premarital heterosexual intercourse more easily than they endorsed same-sex sexual behavior. The resolutely heterosexual Malinowski, for example, was ambivalent. In an essay written in the late 1920s or early 1930s, he supported less "moral censure" and better treatment of homosexuals in his own society, but he also placed homosexuality on the side of "moral laxity" and promiscuous free love. He worried that homosexuals and unmarried heterosexual free lovers would "infect" others and undermine heterosexual monogamous marriage and reproduction. In his books on the Trobriand Islanders, he posed homosexuality as a western imposition. White imperial rule imposed a separation of the sexes, which created "unnatural conditions of life," as seen "in gaol, on missions stations, and in plantation barracks. . . . The white man's influence and his morality, stupidly misapplied . . . , creates a setting favourable to homosexuality." The Trobriand Islanders, Malinowski also found, had less "nervous excitability" than westerners. Sexual acts other than intercourse, such as fellatio, were for them "preparatory erotic approaches" (foreplay, preceding sexual intercourse) and had "less tendency to pass into autonomous acts, that i perversions, than is the case among more nervously excitable races."16
In Coming of Age in Samoa (1928), Mead had a somewhat similar which freer heterosexuality put a damper on permanent homosexu tory" acts did not qualify as "perversion." But the definitions of wh sexual and what qualified as perversion were still in flux in both th and popular understanding, and Mead attempted to craft her own unde constituted the abnormal. Mead treated as normal and uneventful th sex sexual acts that did not interfere with marriage. According to "play" was common in Samoa. (In one of the tables in her book, sevente five post-pubescent young Samoan women had had "homosexual exp twelve of the twenty-five had had "heterosexual experience.") "Thes relations between girls," she wrote, "never assumed any long-time i were regarded as a pleasant and natural diversion, just tinged with the tinguished the girls or women involved in such relations from the "rea incapable of normal heterosexual response." The bisexual "mixed typ perversion." Mead saw this "casual" sex as minor, as preparation of heterosexuality and marriage. Because Samoans adopted the techniqu tice (what she called "the secondary variations of sex activity which homosexual relations") into their heterosexual routines, they did not such acts, to turn to homosexuality as an adult way of life.17
In the wake of Malinowski s and Mead's popular books, the anth Sapir weighed in on the discussion and expressed his irritation. He had Mead that had ended unhappily, even bitterly, in 1926. Soon after she p on Samoa in 1928, he published a meandering article, "Observations in America." American culture had indeed restricted sexuality too m radicals had overreacted in their rejection of their "repressive and unhe had turned, he regretted, to "promiscuity," and certain unnamed anthr the problem by supplying their willing readers with "excited books abo Samoans and Trobriand Islanders." Sapir not only disliked the advocates also rejected the emerging minority view that homosexuality was a nat expression. "The cult of the Naturalness' of homosexuality," he wrot those needing a rationalization of their own problems." In his publis frained from using Mead's name, but in private correspondence wit stated outright that Mead had inspired his essay on sex. As Lois Ban raphers have confirmed, Benedict, Mead, and Sapir had a fraught triang
In the early to mid-1 920s, Benedict had an intense friendship with Sa years of his first wife's terminal illness, and before his affair with Me 1920s, she had her own sexual relationships with Mead and other w lambasted the modern woman's sexual behavior, Benedict saw in it a cri She shared her suspicions with Sapir, who replied, "you were never onc Sexuality, Race, and Social Constructionist Thought 1067 when I wrote the paper on sex." Mead "and a lot of drivel in her letters," he confessed, had prompted his antagonistic stance: "She is hardly a person to me at all. ... but a symbol of everything I detest most in American culture."18 Despite the animosity, there was some consensus. With Malinowski and Mead, Sapir rejected "promiscuity" but did not object to premarital sexual intercourse. He also agreed that culture constructed sexuality. In his 1928 essay, he noted that much "modern psychiatric writing seems almost deliberately to ignore the cultural point of view." Sex, like everything else, could be understood only in its "historically determined cultural setting." In a more influential article, published in 1932, Sapir supplied another piece of the relativist puzzle. He directly questioned psychiatric understandings of the normal. "Cultural anthropology," he suggested, "has the healthiest of all skepticisms about the validity of the concept 'normal behavior.' . . . Cultural anthropology ... is valuable because it is constantly rediscovering the normal." What was normal in one culture was not necessarily normal in another.19
It was Benedict who brought the pieces together. Increasingly estranged from her husband, she eventually separated from (but never divorced) him and came to see herself as a lesbian. In the early 1930s, she set up household with a woman but continued to use the title "Mrs.," which cloaked her domestic arrangements with her marital status. She remained acutely aware of the stigma associated with homosexuality, and she addressed her concerns in her scholarship.20 She also used her anthropological studies to comment, sometimes obliquely, on other social issues. Politically, Benedict stood further to the left than Malinowski, Mead, or Sapir. Like many leftists of the 1930s, she disliked the aggression that led to war, the racial hierarchies that subordinated immigrants and people of color, the rampant competition that she saw as the basis of capitalist inequities, and the social rejection of nonconformists of various stripes. Through anthropological case studies she suggested that cultures could be valid and viable with alternative social arrangements.
On sexuality, she made her major theoretical moves in her article "Anthropology and the Abnormal," which the Journal of General Psychology accepted for publication in 1932 and published in 1934. Here she countered the predominant view that homosexuality was always abnormal. As Sapir had suggested elsewhere, normality was relative. In other cultures, Benedict wrote, "our abnormals" -people considered abnormal in the United States -"function at ease and with honor, and apparently without danger or difficulty to the society." Benedict illustrated her point with three examples -people who fall into 18 Edward Sapir, "Observations on the Sex Problem in America," American Journal of Psychiatry, 8 (Nov. 1928 Hankel (New York, 1930), 123-24. trances, homosexuals, and paranoiacs -and carefully cushioned homos her lengthier treatment of the other two. In "our culture," she wrote, hom poses an individual to all the conflicts to which all aberrants are always ex sexuals appeared "incompetent," it was not because of their homosexu "the culture asks adjustments of them that would strain any man's vitality which "homosexuality has been given an honorable place . . . those to w nial have filled adequately the honorable rôles society assigns them." S trait might be congenital or conditioned in early childhood, but in either ture "accorded [it] prestige" and did not treat it with "social contempt it belonged, in that time and place, to the category of the "normal."
claimed that societies molded their members to fit "the fashion ofthat cul er traits and behaviors, sexual expression was culturally constructed. "M she wrote, "are plastic to the moulding force of the society into which th societies that valued homosexuality, more people would be homosexual.
mankind," though not quite everyone, "readily take any shape that is pres And, finally, she made a plea for accepting the outsiders, the few resistan failed to conform to the strictures of their culture. "The inculcation of to preciation in any society toward its less usual types is fundamentally impo ful mental hygiene."21
As others have noted, Benedict's version of relativism did not requir her own judgments about what constituted mental health. She left ope that "absolute categories of abnormal psychology" could in some way b expressed distaste, for example, for the individualist self-seeking and ethos of her own society, which she saw as unhealthy. "Western civilizatio "allows and culturally honors gratifications of the ego which accordin category would be regarded as abnormal." That critique captured her social and it also may have served as a dig at various men, including Edward described, in private correspondence, as egotistical. In her article, she wro dled and arrogant egoists," who were "probably mentally warped to a grea many inmates of our institutions." (Of Malinowski, she wrote in a 19 one of the most annoying individuals . . . vain to the point where any resp would have to lock him in a madhouse.") She called ultimately for "soc that recognized that "our local normalities" were not "universal sanitie Sexuality, Race, and Social Constructionist Thought 1069 book provided a primer on the diversity of cultures, cultural relativism, and the plasticity of human behavior. Like her mentor Boas and his other students, Benedict argued against biological determinism and for the "immensely important rôle of culturally conditioned behavior" in shaping individual personality and group ethos. She repudiated hierarchic notions of races and looked instead for local cultural "configurations," patterns, or gestalts that had developed historically and now characterized the behavior of particular "primitive" peoples. In three case studies -of the Zuni of New Mexico, Dobu of northwestern Melanesia, and Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island -she depicted cultures that allegedly emphasized pleasantness and sobriety, treachery and fear, and rivalry and shame, respectively. In Benedict's hand, some cultural groups (the Dobu, for example) seem decidedly more malevolent than others; nonetheless, each culture, she found, had its own vitality and validity. In the final chapter, "The Individual and the Pattern of Culture," she returned to the relativity of normality and to her defense of homosexuals and other "abnormals." If each culture encouraged only "a segment of the great arc of potential human purposes and motivations," what happened to the "aberrants" whose behavior fell outside the local norm? In American society, she looked to the future for "tolerance and encouragement of individual difference" and criticized the conformist fear of "eccentricity." The book had an immediate impact in anthropological circles and outside of them. As Benedict noted in a letter, she had written the book "for a more general audience."23 It brought her views on sexuality to a wider public than her article, published in a scholarly journal, could possibly have reached.
The writings of Malinowski, Mead, Sapir, and Benedict laid the foundation for the early culture-and-personality understanding of sex. In later years they would modify their positions, in mostly subtle ways, but their enduring stance, evident by the early 1930s, was that cultures shaped the sexual behavior of their members, that all cultures regulated sexual expression, and that some forms of regulation were more damaging to personalities than were others. In the United States (for Mead, Sapir, and Benedict) and in Britain (for Malinowski), the repression of sexuality created psychological problems. For all of them, culture influenced both the prevalence of homosexuality and the attitudes toward it. When a culture devalued homosexuality, it might appear anyway because of inborn temperament, gender segregation, social trends, imperial incursions, or early childhood experience. For Mead and Benedict, same-sex sexual behavior was not necessarily abnormal. For Benedict in particular, homosexuals were not lesser or inferior or mentally deficient unless the stress caused by social disapproval made them so. Cultures should, she suggested, accept and value their "abnormals," and "abnormals" themselves should "realize" that the source of their "misery" was not their abnormal practices but their "despair at ... Klineberg summarized the new literature on race in Race Difference 1930s, this book was the preeminent work in the United States challen of racial difference. Klineberg dedicated it to Boas, "whose teaching made t sible." He stated his argument in the preface: "there is no adequate proof o race differences in mentality . . . those differences which are found are in due to culture and social environment." He then went on chapter by chapte earlier studies that had argued for innate racial differences in intellige criminality, and mental health. In the end, he rejected any attempt to deli chy of races, and he spoke out against laws that restricted immigration by and those that prohibited interracial marriage.26
What is less well known is that Race Differences was also a manifesto for thinking about human difference more generally. The last third of the bo tled "The Cultural Approach" -went beyond the issue of race to lay out th of the culture-and-personality school. Here Klineberg emphasized the c variability in human behavior. Differences in styles of parenting, aggressi tiveness, emotional expression, and gender roles -all were caused by cu cultures had different rules, different attitudes, and different concepts of 25 produced different kinds of adults. But Klineberg was more inclined toward the culture side of the culture-and-personality equation. His vision of homosexuality was not the psychoanalytic one. He did not pose homosexuality as a neurosis, perversion, or mental disturbance, which was the prevalent psychoanalytic position. The meaning of the behavior depended on the culture. "It is culture," he wrote, "that can make the same form of behavior taboo in one society and apparently indispensable in another." Like Benedict, he suggested that "differences between individuals" in the same culture might result from either "constitutional factors" or "early experience and conditioning." But either way, he was interested in same-sex sexual behavior primarily as a sign of cultural diversity. "A deviant in one community" he wrote, would be "perfectly normal or even a superior person in another. . . . There is, therefore, no abnormality as such; there is simply deviation from the accepted pattern, whatever that may be."29
This position -pioneered by Benedict, adopted by Klineberg -included a pointed critique of the concept of normality and especially questioned psychiatry, with its categorical proclamations of what was normal and abnormal. It made its way into other accounts of sexuality and abnormality in the 1930s and 1940s as anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts drew on it. An article in a sociology journal in 1941 concluded, "as a broad proposition" it was "readily accepted by other social scientists" (and it also "troubled the psychiatrists"). Klineberg, Social Psychology (New York, 1940) , 508-9. In the latter book, Klineberg suggests that some conditions might be abnormal in all contexts, but he explicitly excludes homosexuality from the universally abnormal.
30 On the history of the concept of normality, see Carter, Heart of Whiteness. Julian Carter, though, does not ad- For the refugees and for American liberals and leftists, Nazi Germany became the primary source for and the critical sign of a damaged (and damaging) culture. Some of the anthropologists (Benedict, for example) could barely disguise their distaste for cultures that fostered violence, militarism, racism, and rampant competition, but when the Nazis rose to power, many culturalists gave up even the pretense of tolerance and engaged in direct campaigns to expose and defeat fascism. In this way, fascism threw a wrench into the relativist machinery and pushed the culturalists -who usually claimed that all cultures were valid and valued -to denounce at least one. It also pushed them to use ethnography to examine industrialized nations, to ask how German culture had promoted the shocking Nazi rise to power, and to study "racial prejudice" as well as race differences. As early as 1936, Benedict noticed that "the German exiles" of the Frankfurt School and the social psychologist Kurt Lewin, among others, had begun to study family life in German culture. "There is certainly a need," she wrote, "for careful work on the cultural conditioning of groups within western civilization."33 Fascist Germany posed the ultimate test case that undermined relativism, but the United States, too, inspired concern. In the early and mid-1930s, social commentators suggested that the United States was a "sick society" in need of cure. The 1932 anthology Our Neurotic Age and Karen Horney's 1937 book The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, for example, pointed to cultural contradictions, pressures, and tensions that seemed particularly damaging to Americans' psychic health. In his widely read article "Society as the Patient" (1936), Lawrence K. Frank wrote, "There is a growing realization among thoughtful persons that our culture is sick, mentally disordered, and in need of treatment." In the midst of the Great Depression, Frank showed surprisingly little interest in the economy; he asked his readers instead to understand "crime, mental disorders, family disorganization, juvenile delinquency, prostitution and sex offenses" as "human reactions to cultural disintegration." The "conception of culture and personality," he wrote, "offers some promise of help." With it, Frank suggested, scholars could turn to exploring "how culture can be revised." Instead of positioning all cultures as equally valuable, Frank and others suggested that some cultures were more damaged (and damaging) than others and, therefore, in need of change.34
But where did the cultural problem lie? In one widespread formulation (simplified here), parents -with the blessings of their culture -repressed their children, which caused frustration in early childhood, which in turn caused aggression and neurosis in adult citizens. This formula could be used to explain social ills in various cultures. In one common variation, authoritarian German fathers repressed their children who then grew up to be fascists and racists; in another, smothering American mothers reared delinquent or homosexual sons. As one commentator noted, "The clinging mother is the great emo- Montagu was a popularizer par excellence, who broadcast the existin much as he innovated it. Like Klineberg, he won his first fame for his race, starting in the late 1930s, and culminating with his best-selling b
Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, first published in 1942. Montagu arg traditional static taxonomies of race, against conceptions of racial hierarch American "caste" system based on race, and against racial prejudice. Alo ful of progressive biologists of his day, he advocated replacing the biologic concept of "race" with the term "ethnic group." After World War II, he dr Unesco statement on race, a project on which Klineberg worked as we also a prolific commentator on gender from the 1940s on. In 1940 he p statement, influenced by Mead, on culture as the source of psychic dif the sexes, and in 1946 he drew parallels between "anti-feminism and ra 1952 he published a controversial article, "The Natural Superiority of Saturday Review, and the next year he published an expanded book-length essay, under the same title. In his work on gender, as in his writings on ra together his training in physical and cultural anthropology. He discussed p Sexuality, Race, and Social Constructionist Thought 1075 enees between women and men, and he increasingly portrayed women, especially mothers, as essentially more humane and less selfish than men. But he also returned repeatedly to the cultural construction of gender roles and argued against long-standing myths of women's inferiority. Montagu also wrote about homosexuality, especially in an article on the first Kinsey volume, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948). In the wake of the Kinsey report, the mass media called on various experts, including culture-and-personality figures, to offer commentary. Margaret Mead participated in a symposium and published her comments, Ruth Benedict spoke on the radio, and Erich Fromm wrote an essay. Montagu s contribution appeared (along with Fromm's) in About the Kinsey Report:
Observations by 11 Experts on "Sexual Behavior in the Human Male" (1948) .37
In the 1 940s Montagu, like Benedict and Klineberg before him, helped popularize the cultural argument. In 1942 in his book on race, he wrote: "If we agree that mankind is everywhere plastic, adaptable and sensitive, then we can only account for the mental and cultural differences between the varieties of mankind on the basis of a difference in experience." He saw "no reason to believe" that differences among ethnic groups in "temperament, intellectual attitudes, and cultural behavior" were "inborn." In 1948, in his article "Understanding Our Sexual Desires," he made similar statements regarding sexuality. He found "that how a person behaves sexually is largely determined not by inborn factors but by learning." "Homosexuality," he wrote, "is practically always an effect of certain types of cultural experience or conditioning." Like Klineberg, then, Montagu used cultural assumptions to argue against biological determinism, but he drew different conclusions in the domain of race than in the domain of sex. On race, he wanted to minimize but not obliterate group differences. In Man s Most Dangerous Myth, he called for recognizing the "likenesses," what he called "the essential unity in all mankind."38 He embraced a classic humanist argument, but like most anthropologists, he could not dismiss the value of cultural variety. His approach to sexuality, however, differed. Even though sexual variation (like ethnic or cultural variation) was, in his view, a result of experience and cultural conditioning, he wanted to eliminate it entirely.
Montagu insistently rejected, and even seemed to resent, Kinsey's attempt to redefine what was considered abnormal. "The social criteria of this society," he stated in 1948, "have always been, and we may predict will always continue to be, that homosexuality is an abnormal form of behavior." Good liberal that he was, he called for "an enlightened view of the position of the homosexual." Like other sexual liberals of his day, he did not advocate punishment or intolerance. But he did distinguish sympathy for the individual from "condoning" his or her condition. Unlike Klineberg and Benedict, he explicitly rejected the relativist view of sexuality. For Montagu, homosexuality was not just considered abnormal within the context of cultures that devalued it. "Homosexuality," he wrote, "is definitely an abnormality whenever and wherever it occurs in human societies." vanishing point." And so he hoped to get rid of the sexual diversity colleagues portrayed in the very same year as benign natural variation. Popular psychoanalytic theory bolstered Montagus discussions of both ity. On race, he used the frustration-causes-aggression argument to exp race prejudice and race hatred. In Montagu's account, frustrations in "to resentment, to fear, to hatred and aggressiveness." "Race preju took place through "such . . . psychological mechanisms as displacem tion'' On homosexuality, he also placed the primary responsibility on ea teractions. Among the causal factors, he mentioned "family conditio child "to identify . . . very strongly with" or "hate one or the other pa to different psychological mechanisms to explain racism and homosexua mately used parallel language to describe racists and homosexuals. H as "the effect of an incompletely developed personality" and saw homos plete human being [s] ." Both resulted, he thought, from defects in train ity development. He hoped to eliminate both racism and homosexuality, better education and better child rearing. "By adapting our educativ perfection of human personality," he stated, "we can turn out a hum any desired pattern."41 Many of us today might applaud his call to condemn his call to eliminate homosexuality, but both were part of his in which cultures could be reshaped by retraining parents, revamping c thereby changing the next generation of adult personalities.
Montagu used similar language to explain racism and homosexualit and-personality vision also allowed for other possible homologies. I 1940s, a few observers drew a different parallel between racism or anti we now call homophobia. At least a few commentators explained the irr mosexuals (as opposed to homosexuality itself) as a sign of a damag "sick" culture. For some members of the Frankfurt School, for example homosexuals went hand in hand with racism and anti-Semitism as a tra constructed "authoritarian personality" who had "a disposition to ... breezy 1948 account of American national character, British popularizer who worked with Mead and Benedict, also included an extended acc bia. He expressed no concern with homosexuality, only with American m fear of it. The American males "panic" over homosexuality resulted fro hostility to his especially smothering American mother, his own "femi "encapsulated mother," and his insecure sense of his own active masculi sis of American anti-Semitism, Gorer returned again to insecurity. Ant ther "individual prepsychotics" with "paranoid projections" or unassimi felt insecure in their Americanness. In this formulation, both anti-Sem mosexual panic resulted from insecurities and personality problems and parentally instilled.42 Sexuality, Race, and Social Constructionist Thought 1 077 Pathology in the 1950s: Abram Kardiner Gorer's book was part of a broader culture-and-personality search for the distinctive adult personalities found in particular nations. During World War II, a number of culture-and-personality scholars -Benedict, Mead, and Gorer among them -worked for the U.S. government and conducted "national character" studies of Americans, their allies, and their enemies. On the home front, they hoped to improve morale, and in the war zones, to learn how best to cooperate with the nation's allies and defeat its enemies. The national character studies used early childhood interactions to explain the perceived traits of groups of adults. As Mead claimed, "By examining the methods by which children are reared it is possible to obtain an accurate and reliable analysis of the character of adults." At their best, the national character studies attempted to foster awareness of cultural variety and ethnocentric assumptions; at their worst, they provided reductive reiterations of pernicious ethnic stereotypes. Gorer's studies, for example, associated the alleged rage, hatred, and violence of the Russians with the swaddling of infants and the alleged compulsiveness of the Japanese with overly strict toilet training.43 The enhanced emphasis on culture-specific child rearing practices also influenced the studies of subgroups within the United States, where it placed a heavy burden on parenting, especially on mothers.
Among the analysts in the culture-and-personality circles, none had more influence in this area than Abram Kardiner. Born in 1891, Kardiner grew up in poverty on New York City's Lower East Side. Like Klineberg and Montagu, he was of Jewish descent. His mother died when he was three, which might help explain his later insistence on the traumatic effect of maternal neglect. He graduated from the City College of New York and entered medical school at Cornell University. But in the 1910s, in the midst of a failed heterosexual romance, he dropped out of medical school temporarily and took courses at Columbia University, including ones taught by Franz Boas. He considered a career in anthropology but instead returned to medical school where he discovered psychoanalysis. folklore, a different religion -they had, in short, a different order of hu work with anthropologists led him to acknowledge human diversity in personality, but he had little taste for the relativist approach. He foun pid," "poorly informed," "unoriginal," and even "malicious." Mead and B did not understand psychodynamics, and (perhaps most damning in hi credit for innovations that he considered his own. In turn, Benedict, friends disliked Kardiner and his approach. As one anthropologist w 1939, "The thinking is incredibly bad, K [ardiner] has no command of data, and he is overbearing and defensive." For Kardiner, ethnography was to study damage. "The study of a primitive society," he recalled later, "giv broad general outlines of the gross mistakes that can take place, as a re social patterning. . . . You cannot tamper with the normal course of on child without ruining the whole society."45 The problem was not indiv aberrant parents (as in much psychoanalysis) but "defective social patt instilled by parents. By the early 1950s, he had turned his attention to the Kardiner addressed race and sexuality in two books, The Mark of Op coauthored with the psychiatrist Lionel Ovesey, and Sex and Morality Mark of Oppression, Ovesey wrote up the books twenty-five case stud African Americans, and Kardiner wrote the overarching interpretive analy Morality, Kardiner alone responded to the second Kinsey report, Sexua Human Female (1953) . In the two books, Kardiner presented much the explain the behavior of two (overlapping) groups in American society, gay men. In both books, he used a culture-and-personality explanation ture shaped personality, and he also adopted the now-standard psycho in which parents, especially mothers, transmitted culture to their children personality-shaping interactions. The twist in both books was that Americ failed to function as they should, thereby introducing flaws into the proc cultural transmission and forcing children to adapt to an unhealthy enviro dence, Kardiner described the damaged psyches of self-hating people w esteem and dangerous levels of repressed rage and aggression. He argue Oppression that the American "caste system," with its built-in racial discr economic deprivation, had damaged the psyches of African Americans rality, he concluded that American gender roles, or feminism gone-to the psyches of middle-and upper-class (presumably white) men and inspired an epidemic of homosexuality.46
According to both books, cultural problems caused bad parenting, and bad parenting injured the psyches of children who then grew up as damaged adults. American families -the transmitters of culture -had suffered, broken by divorce or desertion and stymied by confused gender roles. In both cases, Kardiner pointed especially (though not exclusively) to perceived maternal failings, such as neglect and dominance, which resulted in children who were, he said, unable to create the kinds of emotional ties that hold a sound society together. The result, for Kardiner, was neurotic people who engaged in apathetic, criminal, hedonistic, perverted, submissive, depressed, distrustful, overly aggressive, or overly passive behavior. Kardiner emphasized oppression in his analysis of race but not in his examination of homosexuality; however, the same underlying logic explained the alleged pathologies of African Americans and homosexuals. The cure in both cases involved reestablishing conventional gender roles in which women served primarily as mothers. For Kardiner (and for Mead, the sociologist Talcott Parsons, and others), conventional gender roles were social, not biological; they had developed historically in each culture to manage reproduction, and they served a critical function in the mental health of children. Kardiner used the anthropology but discarded its relativism. His study of other cultures had convinced him that "the patriarchal-monogamous family" was the best for the child. Alternative forms of child rearing endangered not only individual health but also collective order.47
As the historians Ellen Herman, Daryl Scott, and others have shown, after World War II various social scientists argued that African Americans were psychologically damaged by racial prejudice, class and caste subordination, and matriarchal families. Kardiner, in particular, and the culture-and-personality school, more generally, played a central part in developing this approach and in calling attention to psychodynamics, child rearing, and mothers. The tendency to view people of color -especially African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans -as damaged personalities continued into the 1960s, when it was elaborated upon by the anthropologist Oscar Lewis (who studied with Benedict and Klineberg), Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and others who wrote about the "culture of poverty" or the "tangle of pathology." It was no accident that African American and Latino/a activists protested the "culture of poverty" thesis, which portrayed them as pathological, Morality, Kardiner's account of homosexuality did not address race and seemed to refer presumptively to the white middle class. Kardiner was not particularly interested in the intersections of race and sexuality or in how conceptions of sexuality were racialized and conceptions of race were sexualized; he focused more on what he portrayed as the common cultural and psychodynamic origins of racial and sexual pathologies. Alfred C. Kinsey et al., Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (Philadelphia, 1953) . A few historians have noted how some social scientists and social workers attributed the alleged mental deficiencies of African Americans to cultural pathology and the alleged mental deficiencies of whites to individual psychological aberration. Kardiner and the culture-and-personality school more generally show the two views as more intertwined. Kardiner acknowledged the inferiority, subjectivity, and individual psychological life of African Americans (as well as their alleged cultural pathology) and pointed to cultural causes of the alleged neuroses of whites (as well as to their individual psychological constitution). On "black pathology" and "white neurosis," see especially Regina G. Kunzel, "White Neurosis, Black Pathology: Constructing Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy in the Wartime and Postwar United States," in Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945 -1960 , ed. Joanne Meyerowitz (Philadelphia, 1994 47 Kardiner, Sex and Morality, 196. On Kardiner and motherhood, see Buhle, Feminism and Its Discontents, 154-55; and Ruth Feldstein, Motherhood in Black and White: Race and Sex in American Liberalism, 1930-1965 (Ithaca, 2000), 53-60. 1 080 lhe Journal of American History March 20 1 0 at roughly the same time that gay liberationists protested psychiatrists' v ality as pathological, and that feminists, too, protested the negative portr On those specific issues, they all were arguing, in part, against a culture-a social constructionist vision that posited flawed cultures, weakened fa mothers, and vulnerable children who grew up to be abnormal adults.48
But critics did not wait until the 1 960s and 1 970s to register their dis comments on blacks and gays attracted skepticism from the start. In the can press and in African American scholarly journals, several reviewer Oppression resented Kardiner's portrayal of black people as neurotic. They peatedly how he could draw broad conclusions from only twenty-five residents of the unique community of Harlem, most of whom, if not all, neurotic." As Kardiner himself remembered in 1963, people interpreted h Negro ... as against the interests of these people." Likewise, in the ho gay rights) press, at least one reader recoiled from a positive review of K Morality. The review had come out in 1955 in the first issue of the M and it inspired a letter, published under the headline "Reformers Can if homosexuality was not biological (and the letter writer thought the yet resolved) and even if homosexuals were "twisted and gnarled" by early conditioning, clinical case studies eliminated "the profound human emo human experience," and "the music" of homosexuality. "There is greater t "in [Walt Whitman's] Song of Myself 'than in all the psychiatric case histo lished. When psychotherapy attempts to be more than just the key to fre man, then it becomes another tyranny."49 As the critical commentary su pathologizing approach was not universally welcomed.
Benedict's Postwar Resurrection
One way to construct this history is through a narrative of one-way change, in which the leadership of the culture-and-personality school shifted from the relativists, such as Benedict and Klineberg, to the pathologizers, such as Montagu and Kardiner. But that story fails to capture a more complicated history, in which both tendencies coexisted in tension, often in the works of individual authors, through much of the twentieth century.
None of the relativists ever asked for a total suspension of value judgments. In the face of fascism, to give the most often-used example, even the most avid relativists backed away from the claim that all cultures were equally worthy. But even as they backed away, the culture-and-personality scholars continued to use the relativist vision to question accounts that reinforced and naturalized traditional social hierarchies. They asked their readers to think critically about their own (and other) societies by reminding them that there was more than one way to construct a viable social order. They applied their relativism Sexuality, Race, and Social Constructionist Thought 1081 and their pathologizing strategically and pragmatically, not as either/or blanket approaches, but as useful ways of thinking about particular social and political issues. Like many of us today, they debated which socially constructed differences should be construed as "coexisting and equally valid" contributions to an enriching diversity and which socially constructed differences should be placed in a hierarchy of better and worse.50
In any case, in the postwar era, the plot of the story thickens and turns. Just as it seemed that the pathology model had undermined cultural relativism, Ruth Benedict's early vision of relativism made its greatest foray into the public domain. In the late 1940s and after, Benedict's Patterns of Culture recaptured the public eye. During World War II, Benedict reached a high level of public recognition when, with the anthropologist Gene Weltfish, she wrote a controversial pamphlet, The Races of Mankindy which repudiated biological theories of race difference. The 1 943 pamphlet included the now-standard culture-and-personality arguments against racial hierarchies and racism, repackaged in short form to educate the public and also American soldiers. Within a few months it came under attack. Most notably, Kentucky congressman Andrew J. May, the chair of the House Military Affairs Committee, objected to the pamphlet because it reprinted the findings of a 1921 study in which northern blacks had a higher median score on iq tests than had southern whites. In the wake of May's complaints, the U.S. Army, which had ordered thousands of copies of the pamphlet, backed away from it. In the resulting media coverage, Benedict appeared in dozens of newspaper and magazine articles, and her pamphlet became a liberal cause. Within two years, almost 750,000 copies had sold. The pamphlet was taught in schools, excerpted in magazines and textbooks, performed as a play, displayed as a traveling exhibition, and adapted as a filmstrip, an animated film, a comic book, and a children's story. Soon after, in 1946, Benedict published her influential (and still controversial) national character study of Japan, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.
The book, which captured Benedict's ambivalent combination of relativism and social engineering, asked its American readers to study, understand, and "respect differences," and also advocated changes in Japanese culture to make it less militaristic, less hierarchical, and freer. It enhanced Benedict's reputation as an authority on culture, and not just in left-leaning circles. At the end of 1946, General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters invited her to East Asia, in part, as the invitation from the War Department read, "to recommend a course of action for the reorientation of the partially feudal mentality of Japan and Korea to modern democratic needs."51 After World War II, then, Ruth Benedict was a major figure, a well-known public intellectual at the height of her political clout. Because of her growing fame, Penguin Books reissued Patterns of Culture in 1946 as a cheap paperback, which sold for 25 cents a copy. The literary critic and queer theorist Siobhan Somerville has called recently vestigate "the unacknowledged logic" that underlies constructions of r "within the same . . . history." Instead of looking at the history of either ity, she calls for "an approach that historicizes the . . . production of formations simultaneously and that can account for the ways that ide been mutually constituted." The culture-and-personalky school, with i interdisciplinarity, invites us to look at the "unacknowledged logic," as
